
05: The Internet and its Gatekeepers
For many Africans, it is mainly private foreign companies that enable and but also shape our how we practice our right to freedom of expression and access to information online. In addition, Governments may also act online gatekeepers. They have developed a taste for imposing Internet blackouts or blocks on content to suppress dissent. And they take advantage of online surveillance technologies which allow them to intrude on citizens’ right to privacy, inspecting online behaviours the moment you pass through a portal. They also intimidate platforms to “de-platform” critical voices, even when these are not illegal nor against the platforms’ terms of service.
INTERNET COMPANIES AS GATEKEEPERS
A couple of huge Internet companies provide the tools to use the Internet. Under the current set-up where alternatives are small and few, without the known Big Tech services we can’t get anywhere online.
In other words: The way we practice our basic human right of freedom of expression and access to information online is shaped mostly by the profit motives of private enterprises. And, in the case of X and Meta’s apps, the value systems of their main owners (Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg) translate into undue influence on the content environment. The platforms are the “intermediaries” that mediate – to put it mildly – between us and most of the online content that we receive or post.
Hundreds of millions of people around the world now search, spend time, communicate and consume content via browsers, apps, platforms and devices developed by a handful of mostly US-American firms, with Chinese companies catching up. The top social media apps by revenue in 2024 were Facebook, Instagram (also Meta), YouTube (Alphabet, also owners of Google), TikTok (Chinese company Bytedance), LinkedIn (Microsoft), Telegram (Pavel Durov) and X. Companies like the (misnamed) OpenAI, owners of ChatGPT, already act as gatekeepers, but are also increasing this role by boosting social aspects of their services (eg. sharing) in order to mine people’s networks and related behaviours in the quest to get more data.
Algorithms as pathfinders
These few big players dominate the market and strongly determine the diversity of what we receive and share. They operate with the help of algorithms, which are instructions encoded in computer programmes that serve, among others, to limit or direct our online choices. These codes are typically designed to prioritize “addictive engagement” – to keep users on the platform or service for as long as possible, and thus create maximum profit for the company through collecting (and selling) personal data and by showing users more and more personalized advertisements.
To the same end, the algorithms give users to see more of the same kind of content they are already consuming. Many people end up in an “echo chamber” or “filter bubble”. Their views and perspectives are reinforced by endless variations on always the same “information” and opinions – even if what they are offered are conspiracy theories, disinformation and hate speech. For adolescents in particular, whose identities are still in formation, this can be very manipulative.
Surveillance capitalism
When we use Internet platforms (and AI services), we also enable them to use us – for constant data-mining. While scrolling through social media, user data is are slurped up by the providers, down to the micro-seconds you spend on swiping or just glancing at content. Many people ask ChatGPT for answers, without realizing that their questions – no matter how private – are also used as data. The same applies when they input documents asking for improvements or summaries.
Some observers call this extraction and use of data “surveillance capitalism”. They warn that it is increasingly working towards a form of mind control that operates below the radar of our consciousness. For instance, we just take for granted that some content, rather than others, will pop up at the top of the search or social media when we connect. But there are commercial reasons behind what is selected and what is downplayed or excluded. Generative AI apps like ChatGPT may begin to operate by the same logic, particularly in terms of skewing results in order to prolong “chats” with the aim of collecting more data from us.
Withdrawal of services by tech giants
What if unaccountable private actors decide to shut off their systems or withhold services at will, as it suits their business or other interests? The problem surfaced in early 2025 when rumours became public that Elon Musk’s company Space X might disconnect its 15 000 Starlink terminals set up in Ukraine (financed by Poland). These links are meant to ensure that the country retains uninterrupted internet access, especially for military communications in its defence against Russia.
Despite heated denials by Musk, the worry remains. More and more countries could become dependent on the goodwill of one private company with a very politically-motivated owner. According to Space X, by March 2025, 14 African countries had concluded contracts with Starlink for services. Besides for dependence on this company, there could also be concerns about potential data flows from Starlink to a service called Starshield. This, as reported by Reuters, is Musk’s sister satellite network which he is building for US intelligence clients.
GOVERNMENTS AS GATEKEEPERS
Governments across Africa increasingly use Internet blackouts as a tool to suppress dissent, with 2024 marking a record high for digital censorship. According to a report by Access Now and #KeepItOn, in that year, 21 internet shutdowns were recorded across 15 African nations, surpassing previous highs in 2020 and 2021. Prolonged shutdowns isolate communities and disrupt economies.
Such shutdowns are relatively easy for governments to effect by ordering Internet service providers to suspend connectivity as a whole or to block certain websites or apps. The ISP companies are dependent on government licences and will mostly comply with such orders for fear of retribution or legal action.
Governments mostly cite “national security” as justification for such shutdowns – usually meaning the protection of their own secure stay in power as the only guarantors of ‘national security’. This is a favourite excuse when there is the prospect of a sitting government losing an upcoming election, and it certainly does not comply with the African Union’s 2017 Guidelines on Access to Information and Elections in Africa which affirm that:
“The body responsible for regulating the broadcast media, and any other relevant national security, public or private body involved, … shall refrain from shutting down the internet, and any other form of media during the electoral process.”
Other methods to suppress access to the Internet
Less drastic methods of suppressing access are the throttling of Internet speeds, making the net exceptionally slow (but not impossible) to use. In some cases, government agents also monitor social media in order to block dissenting content, to get people arrested or make them “disappear” for what they posted online. Governments also pressure Internet platforms to do the dirty work for them, for example by telling them to deplatform certain users or by providing automated blocking of certain content or groups. This chills expression and deters people from online activity.
More than occasionally, big tech companies censor content on behalf of states. This is either under direct instructions, or after striking agreements with governments. The Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information has this to say on the matter:
“States shall not interfere with the right of individuals to seek, receive and impart information through any means of communication and digital technologies, through measures such as the removal, blocking or filtering of content, unless such interface is justifiable and compatible with international human rights law and standards.”
SURVEILLANCE
Electronic surveillance of online communications is a considerable temptation for governments. This goes beyond “social media listening” that keeps track on the mood and concerns of citizens. It goes further to focus deeply on specific individuals who are critical of the authorities.
Governments go on fishing expeditions, through placing spyware on people’s devices or intercepting communications in transit – without any judicial mandate to do so. That’s bad enough, but it is also likely that what content gets harvested also goes back to the largely foreign companies supplying the spyware. Then what?
Authorities can also compel big tech companies to provide user data to them. Even when content is encrypted and companies can’t hand this over, they can still give the authorities useful metadata on the Internet addresses used for the communications involved, how often and when messages were exchanged, and more.
Chilling effect
The collection and use of blanket surveillance data does not only violate citizens’ right to privacy. It “chills” free expression, with people keeping quiet online, in order to avoid making themselves targets for government repression.
The Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa says unequivocally:
“States shall not engage in or condone acts of indiscriminate and untargeted collection, storage, analysis or sharing of a person’s communications. States shall only engage in targeted communication surveillance that is authorised by law, that conforms with international human rights law and standards, and that is premised on specific and reasonable suspicion that a serious crime has been or is being carried out or for any other legitimate aim.”
At a minimum, says the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, state surveillance must be authorized by an independent, impartial and competent judicial authority, certifying that the request is necessary and proportionate. This applies especially when individuals are targeted for in-depth surveillance. Civil society could use the Declaration and this assessment as strong arguments to lobby for laws providing democratic oversight on this matter.
IN SUMMARY
We should be mindful of online gatekeeping. Misuse of the Internet by companies or by the state, or the two together, should be exposed by independent media and civil society. And we should support alternatives like the Signal messaging app and the Mastodon social media platform, along with other “digital public infrastructure”. Such services are not based on profit and data surveillance gatekeeping. They do provide strong encryption, and they are unlikely to collaborate unjustifiably with governments.

This INFO BITE is selected from the online course on Media
and Digital Policy in Africa, offered by Stellenbosch University
in association with Namibia Media Trust.
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